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Recent events in housing markets are attracting much scholarly attention to foreclosures. One line of
research that is developing rapidly focuses on the externalities associated with foreclosure, primarily
a foreclosed home's impact on surrounding properties. There are two general de¯ciencies with this
line of research: the nearly exclusive focus on robust housing markets, and the assumption that
foreclosures themselves, rather than factors correlated with foreclosure, drive down surrounding
housing prices. This paper attempts to ¯ll the gaps in prior research in two ways. First, it focuses
upon a less robust housing market: Cuyahoga County, Ohio (home to Cleveland). Second, it
incorporates parcel-level vacancy and real property tax delinquency (as a measure of neglect) in
addition to foreclosure. We are able to estimate the impact of vacant and tax-delinquent homes on
neighboring properties and correct the estimates of the impact of foreclosures by directly controlling
for nearby vacant and tax-delinquent homes. We demonstrate important di®erences in the impact
of foreclosure in di®erent submarkets. In high poverty areas, we ¯nd evidence of selective foreclosure
in a positive relationship between tax-current foreclosure and neighboring home sales. Pooling these
high-poverty observations with medium and low-poverty observations obscures the large negative
impact of foreclosures that is measurable in mid-to-upper income areas. Finally, we are able to
use the coincidence of vacancy, delinquency, and foreclosure as a measure of abandoned properties.
This measure enables us to estimate of their impact on home values.
Foreclosure, vacancy, and tax delinquency di®er in important ways, though they may all lower
surrounding home values or indicate distress that lowers home values. Foreclosure occurs when
a debtor fails to pay a debt secured by the debtor's home, and the creditor opts to seize and
sell the property instead of continuing to seek payment from the debtor. During foreclosure,
homeowners have little incentive to maintain their homes, as every dollar put into upkeep or
3improvements will primarily bene¯t the foreclosing lender.1 Thus, recently foreclosed homes are
more likely to be distressed due to deferred maintenance than homes that have not recently been
through a foreclosure. Additionally, foreclosure adds a unit of supply to a local housing market.
Assuming a competitive housing market, this additional supply should put downward pressure
on home values. Finally, foreclosure may lower surrounding home values when they are used as
comparable properties by real estate appraisers or realtors to price non-foreclosed real estate. In
light of the volume of properties recently moving through REO (real estate owned), lenders lower
the sales prices of homes they own in order to sell them quickly, because the carrying costs of vacant
properties are high. When appraisers or realtors determine the value of a home, they may select
foreclosed homes as comparable properties without considering the eagerness of the seller.2
Vacancy is closely related to foreclosure, but distinct in important ways. A home that has been
foreclosed upon will be vacant immediately after the foreclosure but the vacancy may be temporary,
as the property is auctioned o® to a new owner or to a bank or investor who usually attempts to
¯nd a new owner.3 Vacancy is distinct from foreclosure in that a property is vacant when it is not
being occupied, which is not a result of a foreclosure in the vast majority of cases (there are seven
1In states that allow de¯ciency judgments, where the lender can pursue borrowers for the di®erence between the
amount owed on the loan and the price paid for the home at foreclosure auction, homeowners may have more of an
incentive to actively maintain homes. Historically, however, de¯ciency judgments are not commonly pursued for many
reasons. For example, homeowners who have gone through foreclosure rarely have the ability to repay a de¯ciency
judgment, and such judgments are more easily dischargeable in bankruptcy than secured debt.
2Real estate appraisal guidelines allow for some discretion when selecting comparable properties. See,
e.g. Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice 2010-2011, Standards 1 & 2, available at
http://www.uspap.org/USPAP/frwrd/uspap toc.htm. Thus, foreclosure liquidations and REO sales may not be
used when selecting comparable properties.
3Not all purchasers at foreclosure auctions seek to quickly ¯ll the home. Some spend time rehabilitating it or
marketing it to other property investors (Ergungor and Fitzpatrick 2011). Some homes remain vacant for years after
a foreclosure, especially high-poverty areas (Whitaker 2011).
4times more vacancies than foreclosures in our data).4 Vacancy lowers surrounding property values
in ways that closely resemble foreclosure. Each vacancy is another likely unit of supply on the
market, which should put downward pressure on home values. Vacant properties are usually not
maintained as well as occupied properties because no one is present on a daily basis to care for them.
While they may be cared for by an owner living elsewhere, there is less incentive and opportunity to
maintain them as often and as carefully as an owner-occupier would. This problem is exacerbated
with long-term vacancy, which occurs naturally in less robust housing markets where there may
not be su±cient demand to reoccupy vacant houses, and in colder-weather climates where a single
winter can cause signi¯cant damage to a property that is not attentively maintained.
While vacancy and foreclosure intuitively put downward pressure on home values through supply
and disamenity channels, real property-tax delinquency does not: it neither immediately creates
additional supply nor is it easily observable by neighborhood residents.5 Yet, certain levels of
tax delinquency may signal the abandonment of property by its owner, because once a property
becomes tax delinquent it may be taken from the owner through tax foreclosure. Property is
abandoned at the point that property owners and inhabitants stop investing in the property with
the intent of foregoing their ownership interests. Abandonment usually occurs when a property's
carrying, operating, or rehabilitation costs are too high relative to the property's value. The
condition of abandoned property deteriorates rapidly, as there is no one maintaining or improving
it. The decision to abandon property is made subjectively, and cannot be directly observed. This
has led previous researchers to use subjective municipal determinations of whether a property
4We consider a property vacant if it is not legally occupied. In some sense this may over-count vacancies, as some
may be occupied by squatters. But such occupants have little incentive to maintain, and virtually no incentive to
improve, the property.
5A tax delinquency becomes a unit of supply if it is eventually subject to tax foreclosure. A tax-delinquent home
might be on the market if the ¯nancially-distressed owner is trying to get out of an unsustainable ¯nancial situation.
5has been abandoned (Mikelbank 2008). While the subjective assessments are not reproducible,
these studies show that when the impact of foreclosed property on surrounding home values is not
considered alongside vacant and abandoned property, it overstates the impact of foreclosure. We
use combinations of reproducible, objective indicators as proxies for abandonment. If we ¯nd these
indicators are informative, they may be a substitute for this di±cult-to-measure status.
In the years following the rapid decline in housing values, hedonic price modeling has been
applied to evaluate the impact of properties that have been through a foreclosure. Foreclosure sales
are easily identi¯ed in county recorder or court records, so many studies have been conducted on the
impact of foreclosures. Often these studies are motivated by suggesting the foreclosed properties
are frequently vacant, abandoned, and blighted. However, foreclosure is a very noisy measure of
the impact of vacancy and abandonment. A few of the studies have incorporated the impact of
vacancy and abandonment, but this has been limited by the unavailability of parcel-level vacancy
data (Mikelbank 2008, Hartley 2010). With data on vacancy, foreclosure, and tax-delinquency, we
can begin to disentangle the impact of each status on the value of neighboring properties.
In order to better understand these dynamics, this analysis is the ¯rst application of hedonic
price modeling to a panel data set, speci¯cally representing vacancy and property-tax delinquency
of residential properties. To the authors' knowledge, this is the ¯rst study to use property-tax
delinquency as an objective indicator of abandonment. This study is the ¯rst to use the U.S. Postal
Service's (USPS) administrative records of vacancy to identify vacant properties at the address level.
The records are commercially available on a monthly basis, so homes can be observed moving into
and out of vacancy. Also, the time variation in the data gives us both increased accuracy in
the count of nearby vacant homes at the time of the sale, and it creates additional variation in
the vacancy counts within neighborhoods. Focusing on within-neighborhood variation addresses
some of the endogeneity issues that always challenge hedonic price analyses. We ¯nd that when
6foreclosure, vacancy, and property-tax delinquency are all included, the impact of foreclosure on
surrounding home values is reduced.
The rest of the paper proceeds in ¯ve sections. In the remainder of this section we review the
relevant literature. In section two, we discuss the theory behind our modeling. In section three we
discuss the data we use and provide descriptive statistics. In section four we discuss our results,
and in section ¯ve we conclude and discuss policy implications of our ¯ndings.
1.1 Literature
Since housing prices cooled in 2007, policymakers are increasingly aware of the external costs of
foreclosure, vacancy, and abandonment. Research has intensi¯ed over the past few years, but it
primarily focuses upon foreclosure. While foreclosure may lower surrounding home values, vacancy
and abandonment have long been recognized by practitioners as more important roadblocks to
revitalizing distressed neighborhoods. Interest in vacancy and abandonment dates to well before
the current crisis. For example, one early paper developed a theoretical model based upon New York
City housing markets that approximated that owners would abandon property when the current
level of rents in the neighborhood did not justify the rebuilding or renovation of a distressed property
(White 1986). Yet this research has rarely made an attempt to quantify the impact of vacancy and
abandonment on surrounding home values.
One gap in research on abandoned properties is the lack of a universal de¯nition of \abandon-
ment." Municipalities tend to use a period of vacancy as a proxy for abandoned structures, but the
period they must be vacant to become abandoned varies widely (Pagano and Bowman 2000). A
structure is generally considered abandoned when it is chronically vacant, uninhabitable, and the
owner is taking no steps to improve the property (Cohen 2001). Unfortunately, to determine that a
property is uninhabitable or in disrepair researchers rely upon an assessment from the municipality
7itself, obtained through inspections (Cohen 2001, Mikelbank 2008). This data is often incomplete,
because municipalities lack the resources to frequently survey all properties within their jurisdic-
tion (Pagano and Bowman 2000). These inconsistent de¯nitions make it impossible to accurately
compare results across cities.
For the purposes of this study, we use vacancy, tax delinquency, and their coincidence as
measures of distress and abandonment. Vacancy is nearly universal among abandoned properties,
as by de¯nition they are not being cared for by either owners or inhabitants. Tax delinquency
has been referred to as \the most signi¯cant common denominator among vacant and abandoned
properties," (Alexander 2005), and correlations exist between tax-delinquency rates and decreases
in home sales prices (Simons, Quercia, and Maric 1998). This is logical, as owners who plan to
retain ownership either pay property taxes or run the risk of losing the property in a tax foreclosure.
Property owners with no interest in retaining ownership have no incentive to pay property taxes.
Owners with no interest in retaining ownership also have no incentive to maintain their property,
so where we ¯nd property tax delinquency, we would expect to ¯nd deferred maintenance.
Research ties widespread vacancy and abandonment to long-term population decline. The pro-
cess of ¯ltering, where the occupation of new, high quality residential construction results in old,
low-quality residential vacancies has been analyzed for decades (Lowry 1960). Cities that self-report
the largest supply of abandoned housing have experienced persistent population loss, suggesting
that abandonment occurs in the later stages of a neighborhood's lifecycle (Cohen 2001). When
building permits outpace household growth in a metropolitan area, ¯ltering causes increased va-
cancy and abandonment in the city's urban core and inner-ring suburbs (Bier and Post 2003). The
durable nature of housing results in a very slow adjustment of the housing stock to match the
smaller population (Glaeser and Gyourko 2005). The lag manifests itself in vacancy and abandon-
ment. Abandoned property is a signi¯cant, long-term problem in older industrial cities that have
8experienced outmigration from their urban cores, but such ¯ltering also leads to some abandonment
in cities with generally robust housing markets.
Until recently, most research on the impact of urban decline has focused on foreclosures in
robust housing markets. The most commonly cited study on the topic estimates that each mortgage
foreclosure within one eighth of a mile (660 feet) of a single-family home lowered its value by about
one percent, based on one year of home sales data from Chicago in the late 1990s (Immergluck
and Smith 2006). In order to determine whether foreclosures create signi¯cant price declines to
surrounding property or are simply a result of local housing trends, Harding, Rosenblatt and
Yao examine the impact of nearby foreclosures on home sales in select zip codes across seven
metropolitan areas over nearly 20 years, and factor in local price trends (2009).6 They ¯nd that
above local housing price trends, each foreclosure within 300 feet lowers a home's value by up to
one percent, and each foreclosure from 300-500 feet lowers a home's value by about one half of one
percent.
Schuetz, Been, and Ellen control for home prices prior to foreclosures and investigate the lin-
earity of the relationship between the number of foreclosures and price discount on surrounding
homes (2008). Using data from New York City from multiple years, they ¯nd that foreclosures
within 250 feet of a home reduce its value by one to two percent. Outside of the 250 foot ring, a
larger number of foreclosures is necessary to impact a home's value: three or more from 250-500
feet lowers a home's value by one to three percent, and six or more from 500-1000 feet lower a
home's value by about three percent.
Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak look more broadly at the impact of forced sales on home prices
(2011). They de¯ne forced sales as those resulting from bankruptcy, death, and foreclosure. Looking
at housing data for Massachusetts over 20 years, they ¯nd that forced sales due to foreclosure have
6The seven MSAs are Atlanta, Charlotte, Columbus, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Memphis, and St. Louis.
9much steeper price discounts than those due to bankruptcy or death. Controlling for the average
level of voluntary sales prices, they ¯nd that a foreclosure within a twentieth of a mile (264 feet)
lowers the value of a home by about 1 percent, and the closer the foreclosure to the home the larger
the discount.
Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) attempt to better understand why foreclosures lower surround-
ing home values. They used a theoretical model for home pricing using comparable properties,
attempting to reproduce the e®ects of appraisers and realtors. They estimated that in Chicago,
each foreclosure liquidation can depress short-run property values of homes within a half mile as
much as 8.7 percent in down markets and 5 percent in up markets.7
Three foreclosure studies have been published making use of transaction and property char-
acteristics data from the suburban county adjacent to St. Louis, Missouri (Rogers and Winter
2009, Rogers 2010, Groves and Rogers 2011). Rogers and Winter ¯nd evidence that the marginal
impact of foreclosure declines with distance from the foreclosure, time since the sheri® sale, and the
prevailing foreclosure rate (2009). Rogers' data reaches back to the years from 2000 to 2005, when
foreclosures where far less common and exhibited larger impacts. A second study presents evidence
that comparable marginal impacts were stronger in the earlier years of the data than in the later
years (Rogers 2010). Most of the estimates are less than one percent per unit when measured
at distances and time comparable to other studies, such as 200 yards and twelve months. The
¯nal study examines the ability of restrictive covenants to mitigate the externalities of foreclosures
(Groves and Rogers 2011).
Only two studies look beyond foreclosure and incorporate vacancy into their analysis (Mikelbank
2008, Hartley 2010). One uses vacancy rates to classify neighborhoods into broad categories.
7This model assumed that foreclosure liquidations of comparable properties are used by realtors when pricing a
home. Anecdotally, realtors and appraisers in less robust housing markets report ignoring foreclosure liquidations
when pricing comparable properties unless there are no other reasonable comparisons.
10Hartley attempts to delineate between the \supply" and \disamenity" e®ects of foreclosures to
determine how much of the price discount was due to each (2010). By looking at di®erent types
of foreclosed property in Chicago, Hartley decomposes the e®ects of foreclosure on nearby housing
in census tracts with low and high vacancy rates. The explicit assumption in Hartley's work is
that renter-occupied multi-family buildings are not substitutes for single-family homes, so a renter-
occupied multi-family building foreclosure will not change the potential housing supply for persons
seeking a single-family home, and vice versa. In census tracts with low vacancy rates, he ¯nds that
each foreclosed single-family home within 250 feet reduces a home's value by 1.6 percent due to
an increase in supply, while the disamenity e®ect of the foreclosed multifamily buildings is near
zero. In census tracts with high vacancy rates, he estimates the disamenity e®ect of a foreclosed
multi-family home lowers surrounding single-family property values by about two percent, while
the supply e®ect is near zero.
One issue common to all of these studies is that they all acknowledge that foreclosures likely
lower surrounding home values by becoming disamenities or adding supply to the market, but fail
to distinguish between foreclosures that are reoccupied quickly, foreclosures that sit vacant and
are well maintained, and those that become abandoned. Hartley's results hint at the importance
of this distinction by illustrating that neighborhood property values are lowered due to supply or
disamenity, depending on the location (and likely the condition) of the property. Understanding
the di®erence between foreclosed, vacant, and abandoned property is critical for policymakers who
seek to understand how to address these issues. Mikelbank illustrates that estimating the impact of
either vacant and abandoned property or residential foreclosures in isolation overstates the impact
of both, based upon his empirical analysis of one year of housing sales in Columbus, Ohio (2008).
In this paper, we build on the previous studies, focusing on the housing transactions in Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, in an attempt to better understand the interplay between foreclosures, vacancies,
11abandoned properties and surrounding home values.
2 Theory
The methods we will employ are based in the ¯eld of hedonic models of real estate pricing. Orig-
ination of these models is generally credited to Rosen (1974). In their simplest application, the
sales price of a home is regressed on indicators of the home's characteristics, and the coe±cients
are interpreted as the marginal prices of those characteristics (see equation 1). Pi is a home sale
price. zij are characteristics of the home and its location.
Pi = ® +
J X
j=1
¯jzij + "i (1)
The HP model relies on some standard assumptions which, nevertheless, could be violated in
reality. It assumes the housing market is competitive and that both buyers and sellers are fully
informed.8 Using a linear speci¯cation suggests that the characteristics of the home can be costlessly
repackaged. This is obviously not the case, so most applications employ a semi-log speci¯cation
that implicitly interacts all the characteristic measures. In this speci¯cation, the coe±cients are
not interpreted as prices, but rather percentage changes in the price.
ln(Pi) = ® +
J X
j=1
¯jzij + "i (2)
Despite including a set of measures of the area surrounding an observed house sale, researchers
generally suspect that there are important unobserved location factors. These include amenities
and disamenities the researchers has not controlled for (the possibilities are endless). The impact
of these factors is also thought to vary with distance. A home closer to the amenity or disamenity
8A signi¯cant number of homes in Cuyahoga County have been purchased by out-of-state investors over the
internet. Homes are also purchased out of REO inventory blindly as part of a bulk sale at a pre-negotiated price.
Full information is doubtful in these cases.
12will have a larger price response. Omitting a distance-weighted indicator of the factor leaves its
in°uence in the error term. Equation 3 is a hedonic price model that gives two options to address
this (Anselin 1988).
P = ¸W1P + ZB + " (3)
" = ½W2" + ¹ (4)
¹ » N(0;¾2I) (5)
Equations 1 and 2 used summation notation to emphasize the contribution of multiple character-
istics to the sale price. We switch to matrix notation (following the literature) here because the
spatial models center on a spatial weight matrix. W1 is a spatial weighting matrix that gives large
weight to the prices of nearby homes and small weight to the prices of far away homes. Multiplying
the price vector (P) by W1 creates a vector of weighted averages of nearby home prices. Including
these averages as a control removes the gradient between high-price and low-price neighborhoods.9
The remaining variation within neighborhoods tells us approximately how much sale prices would
change if we could add or remove distressed properties. ¸ relates the distance-weighted mean sell-
ing price of the other homes to the speci¯c observation. If ¸ is signi¯cant and non-zero, the prices
are said to be spatially dependent. W2 is also a distance weighting, but in this case relating the
errors of the observations to one another through ½. A non-zero ½ indicates spatial error correla-
tion, which would be caused by unobserved amenities and disamenities contributing to the error
terms of nearby homes. ¹ is the normal error remaining after the spatial error has been modeled.
Unfortunately, ½, ¸, W1, and W2 cannot all be estimated at once, so researchers usually make
some plausible assumption about either the spatial weight matrices or the spatial autocorrelation
coe±cients, and estimate the other. Both W1 and W2 can be estimated in the same model, if the
9The negative correlation between vacancy and price is very obvious in maps (¯gures 2 and 1), but it is not the
relationship we are attempting to estimate.
13theory suggests a speci¯c error structure that di®ers from the relationship between the prices. In
this analysis, we do not have a theoretical reason to use a W2 di®erent from W1, and using the same
spatial weight matrix can introduce collinearity issues. We will refer to the correction involving W1
as the spatial-lag correction and the correction employing W2 as the spatial-error correction.
In specifying the spatial models, we use a weight matrix based on inverse distances up to one
kilometer. Closer sales are given larger weights and further homes are down-weighted. The weights
are row-normalized to sum to one, so the product of weight matrices and the price vector or error
vector are all in the same units. In the results below, several other spatial corrections are presented
and the consistency of the results gives us con¯dence that our weight matrices are reasonable and
e®ective at removing the spatial autocorrelation bias.
The estimates presented in the results tables apply a spatial-error correction. The spatial-lag
estimates, which are very similar, can be found among the robustness checks. Wald tests con¯rm
either model is signi¯cantly better than a model without a spatial structure. The test statistics
suggest the spatial-error model is a better ¯t in each of our three main models. In our main results,
(table 4), the ½ values re°ect the extent to which the model's errors are geographically correlated.
The values are between .46 and .68 and are highly signi¯cant. This parameter is primarily of interest
as a control, with the high, signi¯cant value suggesting that it is absorbing unobserved correlation in
the error structure and leading to coe±cients on the treatment variables that can more plausibly be
interpreted as causal. We report ½ in the other models, without further discussion, for con¯rmation
of the models' appropriateness.
If a distressed home decreases the price of a home, that home decreases the prices of homes
nearby, and the prices of the homes nearby decrease the price of that home, then the coe±cient from
the model is understating the impact of an additional distressed home. The average direct treatment
impact represents that percentage decrease in home prices if the decline is calculated to impact
14the neighboring home prices and then fed back into the original home sale observation (Drukker,
Prucha, and Raciborski 2011). The change is calculated and averaged over all observations. When
we calculate the average direct treatment impact, we found that it di®ered from the coe±cients by
one tenth of a percent or less, and it would be lost in rounding. The results we present may be
very slightly understating the impacts.
Two additional concerns are raised in the literature and should be kept in mind when considering
this analysis. The causality between foreclosures and falling home prices can run in both directions.
When home prices are falling, households in economic distress may not be able to sell their home
and downsize or shift to renting. If the recent price downturn has been severe, or if the homeowner
put little money down on the home, they may owe more than the home could sell for. Even if
they can sell the home, they cannot repay the mortgage unless they have other assets. If a housing
market is in the self-reinforcing cycle of falling prices and rising foreclosures, these trends will bias
the estimated impact of foreclosed homes. Somewhat parallel arguments could be made that falling
house prices increase vacancy and tax delinquency. In our data set, we do not anticipate this being
a signi¯cant problem because our time period is only ¯fteen months. Over those ¯fteen months,
the stocks of vacant, delinquent, and foreclosed (within the past twelve months) homes change only
modestly with no pronounced trend. Likewise, the time period is not long enough to fully re°ect
year-over-year price declines. We include indicators for the month of sale in all estimates. These
indicators are intended to adjust for the strong seasonality in cold-weather real estate markets, but
they could also capture a secular trend. Other studies employing ten years or more of data must
take additional steps to account for appreciation or depreciation over that period.
The second estimation issue involves the selection of home sales into our data set. If homes
are held o® the market by owners hoping for a price recovery, we will not observe their sale prices.
If withholding of homes is more frequent near distressed properties, then this could lead to an
15underestimate of the impact of the distressed properties on neighboring property values. Lin,
Rosenblatt, and Yao speci¯ed a model that estimates the selection into a sale and the implied
change in the coe±cient on the foreclosure count (2009). They ¯nd evidence that homes near
foreclosures are more likely to be held in the shadow inventory, but the e®ect on estimates of a
foreclosure's impact is too small to be of great concern.
Most regional economists and policymakers would agree that a data set that covers an entire
urbanized county, as ours does, represents several separate housing markets, rather than one.
For an average buyer, many high-cost neighborhoods would o®er no options within their budget
constraint. Likewise, high-income buyers would not consider a home of any type or price if it is in
a low-performing school district or high-crime neighborhood. When the models are estimated on
a pooled data set, the coe±cients are an average across all types of buyers. It is useful to know
how the impact of a distressed home di®ers in high-income verses low-income neighborhoods, so
we estimate our models on several submarkets.
The speci¯cation of our model is motivated by some practical considerations. First, we are
interested in helping policymakers identify types of distressed homes that have the greatest negative
impact on neighboring property values. Therefore, we are dividing the homes into counts based
on which markers of distress they exhibit, and not allowing them to contribute to multiple counts.
While many papers in the literature use multiple bu®ers to demonstrate the distance decay of the
impacts of a disamenity, we primarily report the impacts within one bu®er.10 We chose the 500
foot bu®er based on ¯ndings in previous studies that suggest at 500 feet, the impact of a foreclosure
is still signi¯cant. A smaller bu®er will show a larger impact, but it misses many of the sales that
are treated. We are reporting coe±cients for ¯ve counts in three submarkets, which is challenging
to interpret. Multiplying the number of coe±cients by additional bu®ers would make the results
10We present one set of results with two bu®ers in Table 6
16much more di±cult to relay to policymakers and is not justi¯ed by the additional information in
this situation.
To brie°y review, we expect each indicator of distress { vacancy, delinquency, and foreclosure
{ to be associated with lower sales prices for nearby homes after controlling for prevailing neigh-
borhood prices and observable characteristics. Vacant homes do not contribute to the vibrancy
or security of a neighborhood. In many cases, no one is attending to their appearance daily, so
grass is mowed less frequently, snow is not cleared, leaves are not raked, etc. Some of this may
be o®set if the home is on the market and the sellers have invested in \curb appeal" cosmetic
improvements. Unless the home is vacant because it is undergoing major renovations, or awaiting
a rental tenant, then the home is either a unit on the market or part of the shadow inventory.
The shadow inventory consists of homes owned by individuals or institutions that want to sell,
but are not actively marketing because they are hoping the market will improve. When a single
lender owns many delinquent loans secured by properties in close proximity to one another, and
in markets where there is relatively weak housing demand, the lender may deliberately pace the
marketing of foreclosed properties. In either case, these vacant homes (which are often easy to
identify in person) signal to buyers that the market is °ush with inventory and shadow inventory,
and therefore they can bargain for low prices.
The case of delinquency is more subtle. One can reasonably say that it is not visible on the street
and very few people look up the tax delinquency status of neighboring homes.11 For homes that
only have tax delinquency, we believe it serves as an objective measure of distress for the property.
If the homeowner is unwilling or unable to pay their property taxes, which eventually results in
tax-foreclosure, it is very likely that they are unable or unwilling to maintain the property. Poor
11While we a referring to the data as tax delinquency data, it does include some uncollected code violation and
nuisance abatement ¯nes as described in section 3. Since these vary widely between jurisdictions, we attempt to
exclude them from the analysis. In many cases, code violations are visible from the street.
17maintenance of neighboring properties is visible to home purchasers if any exterior or landscaping
work is needed.
The impact of foreclosure is more direct, and therefore, we might expect its per unit impact to
be larger. With the exception of strategic defaults, every household that went through a foreclosure
has experienced ¯nancial distress. When the homeowner accepts that they will likely or certainly
lose the home, they no longer have an incentive to invest anything in maintenance. In our data,
foreclosures are indicated after the sheri® sale, so the purchasers may have paid o® the property's
tax delinquency. If no third party investor bids above the lending institution's auction reserve, the
reserve is recorded as the sale price and the lender takes possession of the property. In many cases,
these homes are back on the market or being held as shadow inventory by the lender (Whitaker
2011). If the home is sold out of REO, a second transaction has been recorded at a discounted
price. The direct link between these foreclosure-related sales and other sales is the comparables or
appraisal process. The foreclosed homes will be considered by sellers, purchasers, and lenders in
determining the value of a nearby non-foreclosure property.
We begin with separate counts of each combination of distress because we think homes in
di®erent stages of the process will have very di®erent impacts on nearby homes. When past studies
have estimated the impact of foreclosures, they are rolling together homes that were just auctioned
and are bank owned, homes sold out of REO to speculators that are vacant and delinquent, and
homes sold to families that have paid the property taxes and occupied the home. Our parcel-level
data with all three measures will reveal if certain combinations of distress indicators matter more
than others.
183 Data
The bulk of the data used in our analysis is an administrative dataset maintained to track property
transactions, property-tax delinquency, and assessed values for taxation. These data contain a
rich set of characteristics for all residences in the county. The records are used in property tax
assessments and are updated triennially and with permit data.12 We include measures or indicators
of the following as controls: bedrooms, bathrooms, vintage, style (Cape Cod, Colonial, etc.), lot
size, condition, construction quality, exterior material, heat and cooling systems, garages, attics,
porches, and ¯replaces. We supplement the house characteristic data with measures of the poverty
rate and the college attainment rate for each census tract using estimates from the 2005-2009
American Community Surveys. The vacancy, delinquency, and foreclosure status of the property
itself is included as a control. The vacancy and delinquency measures have large, highly-signi¯cant
in°uences on the sale prices, and they improve our model over others that could only control for
the foreclosure status.
The county ¯scal o±cer also maintains records of all sales with the key elements of dollar
amount, date, seller, and purchaser. Data on tax-delinquency is updated semiannually. We use
two tax-delinquency ¯les. The ¯rst is a list of parcels that were delinquent anytime in 2010, and
the second is a list of properties that were delinquent at any time between January and June
2011. The delinquent amount appears in the record along with any payments that have been made
toward it, even complete repayments. The dates when the properties enter or exit delinquency
are not available, so these data are static within one year or the other. We identi¯ed in the
dataset the properties that have missed a biennial payment by °agging only observations in which
the delinquency amount is at least 40 percent of the annual net tax bill. This eliminates minor
12If a property owner requests a permit to add an addition on their house, for example, the assessor will estimate
the increase in the home's value and adjust the property tax bill accordingly.
19accounting errors (there are hundreds of delinquencies of a few dollars or cents) and the minor
code violations. Housing codes vary widely across jurisdictions in their stringency, enforcement,
and recording with the county. The Cuyahoga County ¯scal o±cer, like many county departments
nationwide, makes tax delinquency data available for download.13
One novel dataset that is being used for the ¯rst time (to the best of our knowledge) is the
USPS vacancy data. This dataset is created when postal carriers observe that a home has been
vacant for 90 days and record it as such in the USPS's main address database (this data does
not include short-term or seasonal vacancies). This prevents mail addressed to the vacant home
from continuously being sorted into the route's load and carried back at the end of the day. The
address database, including vacancy status, is routinely audited and maintained at an accuracy
level above 95 percent. To further increase e±ciency, the USPS makes this data commercially
available to direct mailers. The companies can run their mailing lists through a software program
that marks each record if the address is vacant. Mailings are not prepared for these addresses, so
wasted printing and postage is avoided. The USPS provides this data to private contractors who
sell subscription services. For our research purposes, we have subscribed to the vacancy data since
April 2010. We run our list of Cuyahoga County addresses through the software, and create a panel
of vacancy indicators.
For this analysis, we use the ¯fteen months of sales data that we have been able to link to
complete vacancy data. This covers 11,361 sales in Cuyahoga County between April 1, 2010 and
June 30, 2011. We have attempted to exclude non-arms-length sales, starting by excluding sales
involving personal trusts and spouses. We exclude bulk purchases, where the price paid for a bundle
of properties is recorded for each property in the transaction. In these cases, it is not clear what
13Cuyahoga County makes its data available via Northeast Ohio Community and Neighborhood Data for Organizing
(NEO CANDO). http://neocando.case.edu/cando/index.jsp
20portion of the total prices should be related to the individual properties. We exclude sheri® sales in
which a bank or federal agency repurchases a home on which it holds the mortgage. These prices
re°ect the lender's auction reserve rather than the market value of the home. The sales data are
limited to single family homes. Multifamily buildings are counted in the vacancy, delinquency, and
foreclosure counts. Buildings add zero or one to the counts, regardless of how many units they
have. A multi-family building is considered vacant if less than 25 percent of its units are occupied.
Apartments generally pay taxes via one parcel number while condo parcels must be grouped by
building to determine if the building has over 75 percent delinquent units, and thus adds to the
delinquency counts of neighboring home sales.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
In this section, and in the results, we will present descriptive statistics and models estimated
separately in high-, medium-, and low-poverty submarkets. By comparing the results from the
submarkets with pooled results, it is evident that pooling hides important di®erences. Table 1
summarizes the monthly counts of distressed properties.14 Note that delinquencies are the most
common indicator of distress, with vacancy the next most common. The counts of distressed
properties in the 500 foot bu®ers around the home sales are described in Table 2. The (pooled)
average home sells with four vacancies, eight delinquencies and one foreclosure within 500 feet. Not
surprisingly, all counts are higher in high-poverty census tracts and lower in low-poverty census
tracts. To place the counts in context, we need to think about the distribution of neighboring
parcels. A home in a low-density exurb may only have a handful of neighbors within 500 feet that
could impact its value. In contrast, a home in the densest tract can have over 200 neighbors. The
mean number of parcels in a home's 500 foot bu®er is 98 and the standard deviation is 45.
14More extensive descriptive statistics with standard deviations, maximums, minimums, cross tabulations, and
correlations are available from the authors upon request.
21Maps of one month's vacancies and median sales prices (¯gures 1 and 2) illustrate that the
distribution of vacancies is di®erent in low-price versus high-price areas. Maps of delinquencies
and foreclosures have similar patterns. The counts of the di®erent types of distressed homes are
positively correlated with one another. Most of the observations of the counts are in the low single
digits, and zeros are common. However, there are homes in distressed neighborhoods that are
treated by very high counts of all types of distressed properties.
4 Results
Table 3 presents the results of the three submarket models, and a pooled model, each with seven
separate distress counts.15 The coe±cients on the property characteristics and month indicators
(not shown) are signi¯cant in most cases and have the expected signs.16 Counts of vacant (only)
and delinquent (only) homes have negative impacts between 1.1 and 2.1 percent in each submarket,
with ¯ve of the six estimates being statistically signi¯cant.
Homes that have been abandoned without going through a recent foreclosure should be counted
in the vacant-delinquent category. It seems logical that vacant-delinquent homes would have at least
as large an impact as a home with only one of the markers of distress. This hypothesis is supported
in the medium-poverty market, but does not hold in the other two. Vacant-delinquent homes are
quite common in high-poverty neighborhoods, as indicated by an average count of 4.29 VD homes
near a sale in a high-poverty neighborhood (see Table 2). However, the counts of delinquent homes
are even higher, and there is a correlation of .75 between the two counts. While a signi¯cant
negative impact of 1 percent per additional unit is ascribed to vacant-delinquent homes in high-
15To calculate the estimates reported here, we use a recently released routine from StataCorp. The package, called
sppack, creates spatial weight matrices and estimates spatial models using a maximum likelihood routine (Drukker,
Peng, Prucha, and Raciborski 2011, Drukker, Prucha, and Raciborski 2011).
16A full set of coe±cients are available from the authors upon request.
22poverty tracts, the counts of delinquent homes explain more of the variation. In low-poverty areas,
vacant-delinquent homes and tax-current foreclosures are present in similar numbers. In these areas,
vacant-delinquent homes are certainly distressed, but probably not completely abandoned. The
contrast between the large negative impact of the recent foreclosures and the smaller, insigni¯cant
result for vacant-delinquent homes may re°ect the in°uence of foreclosures through the recording
of discounted sales. Of the four measures involving foreclosure, vacant-foreclosures (tax-current)
have the most signi¯cant coe±cients. Some of the foreclosure coe±cients are positive, which is not
in keeping with the literature, and begs further exploration.
When all seven distress counts are included for three submarkets, this requires presenting
twenty-one coe±cients of interest. Results this complex are challenging to interpret and extremely
di±cult to convey to a general audience, so we considered more parsimonious models that could
maintain the important disaggregations.17 Also, if one takes a treatment with a signi¯cant impact,
such as foreclosures, and divides its counts by a less important categorization, such as vacancy,
there is a possibility of attenuating the coe±cients by introducing multicollinearity and measure-
ment error. Throughout the remainder of the presentation of the results, most of the models are
estimated with the distressed property counts placed in ¯ve categories.18 Within the foreclosed
home counts, we combined the counts divided by vacancy, but maintained the distinction based on
tax-delinquency. The tax status of foreclosed homes proves to be a very informative distinction in
high-poverty neighborhoods. In each case where the counts are combined, the resulting coe±cient is
17We estimated a seven-treatment equivalent of every model for which it is possible. These estimates are available
from the authors upon request.
18We formally tested if the coe±cients for vacant and occupied (tax-current) foreclosures were signi¯cantly di®erent
from one another. Likewise, we tested if the vacant and occupied delinquent-foreclosure coe±cients were di®erent.
In both tests within all three submarkets, the coe±cients were not signi¯cantly di®erent from one another. If the
coe±cients were signi¯cantly di®erent from one another, combining the counts would less appealing.
23a combination of the two impacts, weighted by the frequency of the distressed property treatments.
Our main results appear in table 4. The model suggests that an additional vacant property
within 500 feet reduces the sales price of a home by 1.7 percent in low-poverty neighborhoods and
2.1 percent in medium-poverty neighborhoods. Tax delinquent properties have very similar impacts
on a per-unit basis (1.8 and 1.9 percent respectively) , but these coe±cients would be multiplied
by higher counts because delinquent properties are roughly twice as numerous than vacancies. In
medium- and low-poverty neighborhoods, having a recent foreclosure near a sale has a large negative
impact on the sale price, as expected. A recent foreclosure within 500 feet decreases the sale price by
2.7 percent in medium-poverty tracts and 4.6 percent in low-poverty tracts. Delinquent-foreclosure
counts in medium- and low-poverty neighborhoods have small to modest positive coe±cients, but
much larger standard errors.
Foreclosed homes in high-poverty census tracts display a completely di®erent phenomenon.
In poor neighborhoods, recent foreclosures display a marginally signi¯cant, positive relationship
with nearby sales prices. While it is not plausible that buyers actually value buying near a recent
foreclosure, this positive correlation is consistent with selective foreclosure by mortgage holders.
In these census tracts, where home values are often lower than transaction and maintenance costs
(under $10,000), only homes that are in relatively good condition and on relatively desirable blocks
will resell for a value high enough to justify the cost of foreclosure. In this way, a recent foreclosure
is associated with higher home values among near-neighbor homes. In contrast, the impact of a
tax-delinquent recent foreclosure is -7.6 percent in high-poverty neighborhoods. After the sheri®
sale, if either the mortgage holder or the investor that purchased the property has decided not to
pay the property taxes, it is very likely that they have abandoned the property. This result suggests
that municipalities could identify the most damaging distressed properties in poor areas with two
pieces of data they already have in hand, namely recent sheri® sales and the tax status of those
24parcels.
The contrast between the submarket results and the pooled results demonstrates the need for
di®erent approaches in di®erent areas. Disregarding market di®erences with pooled results leads to
the erroneous conclusion that tax-current foreclosures have no impact at all! It is also evident that
tax-delinquent foreclosures in high-poverty areas are driving the negative impact that appears in
the pooled results. Focusing only on tax-delinquent foreclosures in medium- and low-poverty areas
would not be an e®ective strategy.
4.1 Comparison to Previous Studies
In the submarket estimates, we report three large, signi¯cant negative impacts from recently fore-
closed homes. These range from 2.7 percent for a tax-current foreclosure in a medium-poverty
tract to 7.6 percent for a tax-delinquent foreclosure in a high-poverty tract. Our ¯ndings are in the
higher end of the range of negative impacts from a neighboring foreclosed home that were found in
the previous studies discussed in section 1.1. The large coe±cients on the foreclosure counts may
re°ect a weak housing market, deep into the housing bust. In 2010 and 2011, Cuyahoga County
had a very high inventory of homes for sale. Prices had been declining for several years and showed
minimal indications of recovering. Home prices are usually sticky because sellers need to repay
their mortgages, and they anchor their perception of their home's value based on the price they
paid. However, by 2010, many owners were capitulating and accepting lower prices. Most of the
previous foreclosure impact studies were looking for lowering of values in markets with various
upward pressures.
One of the contributions we promised was to correct the estimate of the impact of foreclosures
by taking into account other distressed properties in the neighborhood and properties with multiple
indicators of distress. In table 5, we present the results of models estimated with each of the counts
25alone (models I-III) and foreclosures divided by tax-status alone (model IV). Contrasting these
models with the main model (V), or a non-exclusive count model (VI) demonstrates that the impact
of foreclosure may be overstated in the absence of vacancy and delinquency measures.19 Even after
dividing the sample into submarkets and controlling for spatial correlation, part of the estimated
foreclosure impact is via its serving as a proxy for nearby vacant and delinquent properties. The
contrast between model III and model VI gives the best illustration of how the results of previous
studies might change if they incorporated vacancy and delinquency data. In areas with relatively
strong housing demand, the estimate of the impact of a recent foreclosure declines by 31 percent
in the presence of other distress measures.
It is common in the literature to report the results in several di®erent distance bu®ers to
demonstrate the rate of distance decay in the impact of the distressed property. Table 6 shows
the results of estimating the model with two exclusive counts in a small (<250ft) and large (250-
1000ft) bu®er. Our results are consistent with previous research. The negative impacts of distressed
properties are generally larger when the properties are closer to the sale. There is an alternate
interpretation of these results like these that is made by researchers who emphasize the endogeniety
of foreclosure. If falling home prices cause foreclosures and foreclosures lower home prices, then
spatial controls may not be su±cient. The later data will feature higher foreclosure counts and lower
prices relative to the earlier data, and the coe±cient on foreclosure will be overstated because it
re°ects both impacts. Similar processes could be at work with vacancy and tax delinquency. Some
studies include foreclosure counts in an outer ring around the sold home to control for the prevailing
frequency of foreclosure in the area. The coe±cients on the inner-bu®er counts are presented as
having reduced bias from the endogeneity of foreclosures. In this interpretation of table 6, there
19By \non-exclusive" we mean the distress counts are made separately. A home with multiple markers of distress
contributes to more than one count. For example, a delinquent-foreclosed house is counted along with all other
foreclosures, and the same house also adds one to the delinquency count.
26are signi¯cant negative impacts from neighboring vacant homes in medium- and low-poverty areas,
at -3.5 and -2.5 percent respectively. Delinquent homes have signi¯cant negative impacts in high-
and low-poverty tracts. The coe±cients on tax-current foreclosures are of consequential magnitude,
but neither approaches signi¯cance. The other coe±cients are a mixture of insigni¯cant results. If
we hold to this spatial interpretation of the results, we would have to conclude that vacancy and
delinquency have large impacts on property values, but foreclosure has no measurable impact.
4.2 Non-Arm's Length Sales
As discussed in section 3, we excluded sales in which the lender was reclaiming a property used as
collateral for a mortgage. Before this exclusion, at least 15 percent of the sales in our data involved
an institutional buyer, seller, or both. If we return those sales to the dataset, and estimate the
models with an indicator for an institutional buyer or seller, we see that the treatment coe±cients
(table 7) are similar to those of the main model. Controlling for characteristics of the homes,
the discounts recorded for homes entering and exiting REO status are enormous. When a bank
or federal agency reclaims a home at a sheri® sale, they set auction reserves between 34 and 56
percent (depending on the neighborhood) less than the sale price for an equivalent property in an
ordinary sale. The discount for homes coming out of REO is even steeper in high-poverty areas,
at 81 percent. The repossessors appear to be recovering some value in the low-poverty areas, but
taking losses in high-poverty areas. Investors, in sharp contrast, buy at a 40 to 55 percent discount
and sell near the average market price. For non-pro¯t "buyers," the estimates return nonsensical
coe±cients below -1. This is because non-pro¯t are given homes more often than they actually
purchase them, and prices far outside the rest of the price distribution are recorded (such as $10
or $100).
274.3 Other submarket de¯nitions
In table 8, we present model estimates with the observations grouped by di®erent de¯nitions of
submarkets. The ¯rst grouping is by central city, inner-ring and outer-ring suburbs. From this
arrangement, we learn that the inner-ring suburbs have the strongest price penalty for a home
being near a delinquent-foreclosed property. The positive correlation between foreclosure sales
prices is larger in the central city model than in the high-poverty model, and it is signi¯cant at
the ¯ve percent level. Tax-delinquent homes have large negative impacts in all areas (1.1 to 2.1
percent).
The next two sets of models sort census tracts by vacancy rates and the pre-existing (2006-
2009) median home prices. The cut-points are selected to place approximately a third of the sales
into each category. Vacancy is positively correlated with poverty, and home prices are negatively
correlated with poverty. However, the correlations are not exact, so each change in the submarket
de¯nition shifts dozens of census tracts up and down. It is worth noting that submarkets de¯ned
by vacancy levels feature reduced variation of this independent variable of interest, just as de¯ning
sub-markets by price will narrow the distributions of the dependent variable.
The basic pattern of the main results is visible in both alternate market de¯nitions. With census
tracts grouped by vacancy rate, several of the coe±cients are smaller than their equivalent with the
poverty-level grouping. The estimated impact of vacancies, delinquencies, and foreclosures are all
lower in neighborhoods de¯ned by low vacancy compared to a sub-sample de¯ned by low poverty.
Vacant-delinquent homes have a larger negative impact if the sample is de¯ned by medium-vacancy
rather than medium-poverty.
When pre-existing home prices are used to group the census tracts, the most of the coe±cients
are larger in magnitude than their equivalent in the main models. The positive coe±cient on
foreclosures is large and signi¯cant in low-price areas, and the negative coe±cients on foreclosures
28in medium- and high-price areas are also larger than their comparable ¯gures from the poverty
submarket (main) results. The coe±cient on vacancies in medium-priced areas is surprisingly
small, and the coe±cient on delinquent-foreclosed homes in low-priced areas is not signi¯cant.
4.4 Robustness Checks
As discussed in section 2, there are several options for addressing the spatial correlation between
home prices. We attempted ¯ve alternate spatial corrections and two corrections for the skewness
of the distressed property counts. For the sake of brevity, we have summarized the coe±cients in
¯gure 4, rather than seven additional tables.20 In the graph, a letter corresponding to the model
is placed along a line corresponding to one of the ¯ve treatments within the three submarkets. If
the coe±cient is signi¯cant at the ¯ve percent level, it is placed above the line. If it is marginally
signi¯cant (.05 < p < .1), it is placed on the line, and if it is not signi¯cant, it is placed below.
Model B is an OLS estimate with no spatial correction to the coe±cients. As we would expect,
the coe±cients are larger than the spatially corrected models in 11 of the 15 cases because they
are letting the distress counts re°ect the variation of other distressed properties. In section 2, we
discussed the spatial lag model and the results of that estimate are represented by C. The di®erences
between the spatial-lag (C) and the spatial-error models (A) are minor with the exception of the
negative impact of vacant-delinquent homes in medium-poverty areas. The spatial lag model gives
an estimate of -4.4 percent, 1.7 points above the spatial-error model estimate.
Model D uses census tract ¯xed e®ects to capture unobserved local amenities and disamenities.
In high-poverty areas, the estimate with census tract indicators (D) suggests a larger role for vacant
homes, while decreasing the estimated impact of delinquent and vacant-delinquent homes relative to
their main (A) model coe±cients. Forcing the model to use only the variation within census tracts
20The coe±cients of all the robustness check models are available from the authors upon request.
29is quite limiting. Approximately one quarter of the high-poverty census tracts have ¯ve or fewer
sales observed. The poor neighborhoods are also usually denser, which means distressed properties
treat more sales within the geographically smaller tracts. Of the seven signi¯cant coe±cients in
the medium- and low-poverty models, only one (vacant-delinquent in medium-poverty) becomes
insigni¯cant with tract ¯xed e®ects. The coe±cients on delinquencies in medium-poverty markets
and foreclosures in low-poverty markets are reduced, but remain at least marginally signi¯cant.
The data can locate each sold home in a jurisdiction, and it is reasonable to think the jurisdiction
has important e®ects on the home price. Thus, an indicator of the jurisdiction should capture a lot of
important unobserved spatial heterogeneity. In Cuyahoga County, cities correspond to signi¯cant
di®erences in property taxes and provide very di®erent levels of city services. They are usually
grouped with one or two similar cities into school districts. Property taxes and school districts
are known to have large impacts on home values (Oates 1969, Downes and Zabel 2002). When
city indicators are included in the model without a spatial error correction (E), most of the results
persist in magnitude and signi¯cance. Adding a city-speci¯c time trend (F) changes the results
only slightly.
The counts of vacancies, delinquencies, vacant-delinquencies, and tax-current foreclosures are
skewed. Most of the counts are below ¯ve, with a handful of homes being sold near 20 or even
50 distressed properties. Model G includes an indicator for observations that are above the 95th
percentile for any of these four counts. The indicator is interacted with the counts to allow for a
di®erent slope at high levels. Model H excludes the observations with the high counts.21 In models
G and H, the signi¯cant estimated impacts of vacancy, delinquency and foreclosure all maintain
at least marginal signi¯cance. These results suggest it is safe to say that a few unusually high
21These estimates also exclude observations with delinquent-foreclosures above 2. DF counts above 2 are only found
in high-poverty areas, so we do not try to address them in model H. Doing so would require including additional
indicator and interaction terms in one submarket, but not the other two.
30observations are not driving the ¯ndings. In the cases of vacant-delinquencies, foreclosures, and
delinquent foreclosures in high-poverty areas, and foreclosures in low-poverty areas, the coe±cients
are larger when the highest counts are interacted or removed. This suggests the marginal impact
of the ¯rst few distressed properties in these counts are underestimated when a linear ¯ts combines
their e®ect with the lower marginal impact of additional units in a high count.
The groupings of signi¯cant coe±cients suggest that the estimated impact of vacancy and
delinquency in medium- and low-poverty submarkets are very robust. In high-poverty tracts, the
estimated impacts of vacancy are tightly grouped, but not signi¯cant. The high-poverty coe±cients
on delinquency are all similar except when census-tract ¯xed e®ects are included (D). On the
foreclosure measures, all of the models agree that there is a positive correlation between tax-
current foreclosures and sale prices in high-poverty neighborhoods. This result is at least marginally
signi¯cant in the presence of any spatial correction. In low-poverty areas, the estimates of the
negative impact of foreclosures are sensitive to the corrections for spatial correlation, but they are
always negative and signi¯cant. In medium-poverty areas, the estimates of foreclosure are tightly
grouped and at least marginally signi¯cant in all but one model.
5 Policy Implications
5.1 Removing Blight
Using our main model, we attempted a simple experiment to estimate the potential bene¯t from
eliminating some of the distressed properties. We returned to our model and re-predicted the sale
prices four times, each time setting the counts on one of the distressed property types to zero. We
sum the increase in the predicted values and divide it by the average number of units with the
marker of distress in a month. This gives a predicted per-unit increase in transaction values. The
31values are implicitly weighted by the sales activity the distressed properties actually in°uenced,
but they suggest a proportional increase in property values of unsold homes as well. This bene¯t
could be weighed against the cost of a program that alleviates distress on properties.
Table 9 presents the results of the experiment. To place the table in context, the total value
of all home transactions in the dataset is $1.4 billion. In per-unit terms, foreclosures lead to the
largest losses of value at $4,665 for tax-current foreclosures in medium-poverty neighborhoods to
$9,489 per tax-current foreclosure in low-poverty neighborhoods. The total values, before dividing
by the units, tell a di®erent story. The total value lost to sellers due to homes that are vacant,
delinquent, or both is estimated at $90 million versus $12.7 million lost due to foreclosures.
If our model is correct, attempting to eliminate the approximately 3,000 foreclosures that a®ect
the high-poverty tracts would be as fruitless as it would be overwhelming. Putting a laser focus on
the approximately 300 homes that are foreclosed and delinquent in high-poverty neighborhoods is
more feasible. Recovering $1.5 million of value for sellers might not justify the expense of a program,
but when the increased value of nearby homes is taken into consideration, the bene¯ts would be
much larger. A successful program would have the indirect e®ect of stabilizing the property tax
base. In medium- and low-poverty areas, preventing foreclosures could salvage some of the $11
million lost to sellers near foreclosed homes.
In this experiment, we are assuming a targeting by type of distress and type of neighborhood.
Targeting would have to take into account equity concerns because preventing a foreclosure in
a neighborhood where homes sell for $300,000 may have a larger percentage and dollar bene¯t
than preventing a foreclosure in a neighborhood with $50,000 homes, but such assistance is rarely
targeted to high-income neighborhoods.
While it is simple in a dataset to remove vacancy or delinquency observations, designing a
program to successfully eliminate these conditions in actual homes is very challenging. In the case
32of delinquency, policymakers should bear in mind that it is unlikely that property tax delinquency
itself that lowers property values, but rather the neglect associated with property tax-delinquency.
Forgiving delinquent property taxes does not change the fact that the homeowner is unable or
unwilling to invest in his or her property. Likewise, eliminating vacancies in homes that are not
candidates for demolition would require attracting migration to the region or stimulating household
formation.
Finally, if lenders are strategically foreclosing on the few desirable properties in highly distressed
areas, there is no easy way for policymakers to obtain the properties that are mortgaged and in
default. In these cases, lenders maintain their ¯rst-position security interests, which encumber
properties and prevent redevelopment. In such cases, creative ways to encourage foreclosure or the
surrender of the lenders' leans would need to be pursued before the property could be eliminated.
5.2 Housing Market Interventions
Since the foreclosure crisis began, state and federal governments have spent billions of dollars on
various foreclosure prevention programs, in part to combat the negative externalities prior research
has associated with foreclosure. Our research suggests that vacancy and abandonment in less
robust housing markets should be receiving at least as much attention as foreclosures. Indeed, this
has long been recognized by community development practitioners, who are often more concerned
with the vacancy and abandonment that sometimes results from foreclosure than the foreclosures
themselves.
Foreclosures are currently a serious problem across the United States, but they are not long-
term problems like vacancy and abandonment. As the economy improves and borrowers are better
able to service their debt, the number of foreclosures will drop. In the meantime, some foreclosures
are quickly reoccupied by owners or purchased by an attentive landlord who rents the property out.
33Thus, not every prevented foreclosure will mitigate the externalities associated with vacancy and
abandonment. But as long as policy remains focused on the construction of new housing over the
maintenance of older ones, vacancy and abandonment will persist. To date, there have not been
many policy responses aimed speci¯cally at vacancy and abandonment, and most are untested.
For example, vacancy registration ordinances have arisen in municipalities across the United
States. They usually require a property to be registered within a speci¯c number of days of
becoming vacant, and subject the property to additional housing code inspections while registered
or at the point of sale. While they do not remediate distressed property, they may incentivize
property owners to reoccupy vacant property to avoid registration, or to take better care of the
property in light of the additional inspections. To date, there has been no research done on the
e®ectiveness of these programs.
When combating vacancy and abandonment, modern land banking is one strategy that shows
promise. Modern land banks are public or quasi-public entities charged with acquiring, remediat-
ing, and placing vacant and abandoned homes back into productive use (Fitzpatrick 2010). The
most intriguing modern land banks are organized under Ohio law, with statutorily de¯ned pub-
lic missions, stable funding mechanisms, and signi¯cantly more power and °exibility than other
modern and historic land banks. In less-robust markets like Genesee County, MI and Cuyahoga
County, OH, land banks often focus upon the demolition and repurposing of older, distressed hous-
ing stock. Like studies of vacancy ordinances, evaluations of modern land banks have been very
limited (Griswold and Norris 2007).
Finally, our results illustrate the di±cult decisions that must be made when deciding how
to allocate resources to combat vacancy and abandonment. It appears that the bene¯ts of each
marginal dollar spent on mitigating vacancy and abandonment would be higher in medium- and
low-poverty areas. However, the incidence of vacancy and abandonment is highest in high-poverty
34areas. The question of whether to focus resources in low-poverty areas in order to reap the largest
immediate bene¯ts or high-poverty areas to address the largest manifestation of the problem does
not have a clear answer.
6 Conclusions
Using our unique data on parcel-level vacancies, and incorporating tax delinquency data, we have
a richer understanding of the impact of distressed properties. In high-poverty neighborhoods, the
sale price of a home is 1.5 percent lower with each additional delinquent home within 500 feet.
Medium-poverty areas display negative impacts of 2.1 percent due to a vacant home, 1.9 percent
due to a delinquent home, and 2.7 percent if a nearby home is both vacant and delinquent. The
impacts of vacant and delinquent homes are similar in low-poverty neighborhoods, reducing sales
prices by 1.7 to 1.8 percent per distressed property. In all areas, delinquent homes are two to
three times more common than vacancies, which makes the e®ect of delinquent homes greater even
though the per-unit coe±cients are similar.
The impact of recent foreclosures is more complex than previous studies suggested. In low-
and medium-poverty tracts, we ¯nd negative impacts around 4.6 and 2.7 percent, respectively, for
recent foreclosures that are not tax delinquent. In high-poverty areas, tax-current foreclosures are
positively correlated with home sale prices. This could re°ect selective foreclosure by lenders on
homes that are in better condition or in slightly better locations. Also, the homes' tax-current state
indicates that it's owner that has some ¯nancial resources and a desire to prevent a tax foreclosure.
In sharp contrast, tax-delinquent foreclosed homes have large, negative e®ects on neighboring sale
prices in high-poverty areas. We observe a discount of 7.6 percent in the presence of these likely-
abandoned properties.
Homes that are vacant can lower surrounding property values, even if they have not been
35through a recent foreclosure and presumably have an attentive owner. Likewise, homes that are
occupied by a ¯nancially-distressed household, that cannot pay its property taxes, also pull down
neighboring home values. Given the high counts of vacant and delinquent homes, we estimate that
these properties are doing more than foreclosures to lower surrounding property values. However,
when it comes to policy responses, concentration on foreclosures with additional distress charac-
teristics would return a far greater bene¯t per unit improved. The other half of the equation,
the costs of improving a vacant-delinquent or delinquent-foreclosed home must be weighed once
e®ective policies for eliminating the impact of these properties have been designed, measured, and
tested.
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38Figure 1: Residential Property Vacancies in Cuyahoga County, June 2010. Vacancy data are from
the US Postal Service. Properties were recorded as vacant if they have been unoccupied for 90 days
or more as of 30 June, 2010.
Median Sales Price
Low (Less than $107,500)
Medium ($107,501 - $147,800)
High (Greater than $147,800)
Figure 2: Median home sale price by census tract in Cuyahoga County, 2006-2009. Data are from
county property transaction records.
39Poverty Rates
Low (0.0% - 5.4%)
Medium (5.5% - 12.0%)
High (Greater than 12.0%)
Figure 3: Poverty rate by census tract, Cuyahoga County, 2005-2009. Data are from the American
Community Survey.
40High Poverty Medium Poverty Low Poverty Total
Vacancies 16,478 4,633 2,839 23,950
Delinquencies 34,371 7,765 4,684 46,820
Foreclosures 3,161 1,262 663 5,087
Single-Distress Properties
Vacant Only 6,778 3,168 2,258 12,204
Delinquent Only 25,636 6,774 4,316 36,726
Foreclosed Only 1,751 622 371 2,744
Multiple-Distress Properties
Vac and Del 8,451 881 319 9,650
Vac and For 1,125 530 243 1,898
Del and For 160 56 30 247
Vac, Del and For 124 54 19 197
Total Distressed Properties 44,025 12,086 7,556 63,666
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Average Monthly Totals of Distressed Properties. The counts are
within groups of census tracts categorized by their poverty rate as measured by the 2005 to 2009
American Community Surveys. The ¯rst three rows are frequencies of each marker of distress. In the
single- and multiple-distress frequencies, a property is only counted in one category, as determined
by its markers of distress. The distressed counts were calculated for each month between April
2010 and June 2011, and then averaged over the ¯fteen months. Vacant properties are identi¯ed
in the US Postal Service database if they have been unoccupied for 90 days or more, as of the
last day of the month. Tax delinquencies are properties that have missed at least one half-year
property tax payment within the last year. Recently foreclosed properties are those that have been
sold at a sheri® sale within the last twelve months. Tax and sales data are from Cuyahoga County
administrative databases.
41High Poverty Medium Poverty Low Poverty
Median Log Sale Price 10.44 11.51 11.98
Median Sale Price 34,200 100,000 160,000
Mean counts in bu®ers High Poverty Medium Poverty Low Poverty
Vacant 3.63 2.00 0.87
Delinquent 12.27 3.95 1.55
Foreclosure 0.88 0.39 0.15
Vac and Del 4.29 0.57 0.12
Vac and Fore 0.67 0.37 0.11
Del and Fore 0.10 0.04 0.01
Vac, Del and Fore 0.07 0.04 0.01
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Prices and Distress counts in 500 ft. Bu®ers around Sales. The
counts are averaged within groups of census tracts categorized by their poverty rate as measured
by the 2005 to 2009 American Community Surveys. The counts are the number of properties
within 500 feet of a sold home that have the row-labeled marker(s) of distress. All data represent
Cuyahoga County properties between April 2010 and June 2011. Vacant properties are identi¯ed
in the US Postal Service database if they have been unoccupied for 90 days or more, as of the
last day of the month. Tax delinquencies are properties that have missed at least one half-year
property tax payment within the last year. Recently foreclosed properties are those that have been
sold at a sheri® sale within the last twelve months. Tax and sales data are from Cuyahoga County
administrative databases.
42High Poverty Medium Poverty Low Poverty Pooled
Vacancies ¡0:011 ¡0:021¤¤¤ ¡0:017 ¤ ¤ ¡0:013¤¤¤
(0:007) (0:005) (0:005) (0:004)
Delinquencies ¡0:015¤¤¤ ¡0:019¤¤¤ ¡0:018¤¤¤ ¡0:017¤¤¤
(0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Foreclosures 0:015 ¡0:017 ¡0:039 ¤ ¤ 0:001
(0:017) (0:013) (0:015) (0:009)
Vac and Del ¡0:010¤ ¡0:027¤ ¡0:009 ¡0:013¤¤¤
(0:005) (0:011) (0:017) (0:003)
Vac and For 0:035+ ¡0:038 ¤ ¤ ¡0:057 ¤ ¤ 0:005
(0:020) (0:013) (0:018) (0:010)
Del and For ¡0:061 0:040 0:026 ¡0:034
(0:044) (0:045) (0:054) (0:026)
Vac, Del and For ¡0:094 ¡0:008 ¡0:033 ¡0:047
(0:064) (0:041) (0:066) (0:034)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 10:703¤¤¤ 11:399¤¤¤ 11:338¤¤¤ 11:014¤¤¤
(0:140) (0:097) (0:080) (0:064)
½ 0:461¤¤¤ 0:559¤¤¤ 0:494¤¤¤ 0:683¤¤¤
(0:044) (0:038) (0:031) (0:024)
N 3;875 3;719 3;767 11;361
Log Likelihood ¡5588:798 ¡2702:994 ¡1434:135 ¡12158:538
Â2 2172:063 3298:377 6006:176 8842:213
Table 3: Disaggregated-Treatment Hedonic Price Models with Spatially-correlated Errors. Notes:
This table reports coe±cients and standard errors, in parentheses, from ML regressions of home
sale prices on counts of distressed properties within 500 feet. Data represent sales of single family
homes in Cuyahoga County from April 2010 through June 2011. Data are from Cuyahoga County
administrative records, the USPS, and the American Community Survey. Signi¯cance key: + for
p<.1, * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for p<.001.
43High Poverty Medium Poverty Low Poverty Pooled
Vacancies ¡0:011 ¡0:021¤¤¤ ¡0:017 ¤ ¤ ¡0:013¤¤¤
(0:007) (0:005) (0:005) (0:004)
Delinquencies ¡0:015¤¤¤ ¡0:019¤¤¤ ¡0:018¤¤¤ ¡0:017¤¤¤
(0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Vac and Del ¡0:010¤ ¡0:027¤ ¡0:009 ¡0:013¤¤¤
(0:005) (0:011) (0:017) (0:003)
Foreclosures 0:024+ ¡0:027 ¤ ¤ ¡0:046¤¤¤ 0:003
(0:012) (0:009) (0:012) (0:007)
Del and For ¡0:073¤ 0:012 0:002 ¡0:039+
(0:036) (0:031) (0:042) (0:021)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 10:705¤¤¤ 11:399¤¤¤ 11:340¤¤¤ 11:014¤¤¤
(0:140) (0:097) (0:080) (0:064)
½ 0:461¤¤¤ 0:562¤¤¤ 0:493¤¤¤ 0:683¤¤¤
(0:044) (0:037) (0:031) (0:024)
N 3;875 3;719 3;767 11;361
Log Likelihood ¡5589:162 ¡2703:950 ¡1434:682 ¡12158:624
Â2 2169:453 3288:544 6006:131 8839:487
Table 4: Hedonic Price Models with Spatially-correlated Errors. Notes: This table reports coef-
¯cients and standard errors, in parentheses, from ML regressions of home sale prices on counts
of distressed properties within 500 feet. Data represent sales of single family homes in Cuya-
hoga County from April 2010 through June 2011. Data are from Cuyahoga County administrative
records, the USPS, and the American Community Survey. Signi¯cance key: + for p<.1, * for
p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for p<.001.
44Model Distress Counts High Poverty Medium Poverty Low Poverty Pooled
I Vacancies ¡0:016¤¤¤ ¡0:028¤¤¤ ¡0:023¤¤¤ ¡0:020¤¤¤
(0:003) (0:004) (0:005) (0:002)
II Delinquencies ¡0:014¤¤¤ ¡0:022¤¤¤ ¡0:021¤¤¤ ¡0:017¤¤¤
(0:002) (0:003) (0:004) (0:001)
III Foreclosures ¡0:005 ¡0:033¤¤¤ ¡0:052¤¤¤ ¡0:018 ¤ ¤
(0:011) (0:009) (0:011) (0:006)
IV Foreclosures 0:006 ¡0:037¤¤¤ ¡0:056¤¤¤ ¡0:014¤
(0:012) (0:009) (0:012) (0:007)
Del and For ¡0:081¤ 0:003 0:001 ¡0:050¤
(0:037) (0:031) (0:042) (0:021)
V (Main) Vacancies ¡0:011 ¡0:021¤¤¤ ¡0:017 ¤ ¤ ¡0:013¤¤¤
(0:007) (0:005) (0:005) (0:004)
Delinquencies ¡0:015¤¤¤ ¡0:019¤¤¤ ¡0:018¤¤¤ ¡0:017¤¤¤
(0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Vac and Del ¡0:010¤ ¡0:027¤ ¡0:009 ¡0:013¤¤¤
(0:005) (0:011) (0:017) (0:003)
Foreclosures 0:024+ ¡0:027 ¤ ¤ ¡0:046¤¤¤ 0:003
(0:012) (0:009) (0:012) (0:007)
Del and For ¡0:073¤ 0:012 0:002 ¡0:039+
(0:036) (0:031) (0:042) (0:021)
VI Vacancies ¡0:001 ¡0:019¤¤¤ ¡0:015 ¤ ¤ ¡0:005+
(0:004) (0:004) (0:005) (0:003)
Delinquencies ¡0:014¤¤¤ ¡0:017¤¤¤ ¡0:016¤¤¤ ¡0:015¤¤¤
(0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Foreclosures 0:012 ¡0:013 ¡0:036 ¤ ¤ 0:001
(0:011) (0:009) (0:012) (0:006)
Table 5: Separate Distress Counts Hedonic Price Models. Notes: This table reports coe±cients
and standard errors, in parentheses, from ML regressions of home sale prices on counts of distressed
properties within 500 feet. Data represent sales of single family homes in Cuyahoga County from
April 2010 through June 2011. Data are from Cuyahoga County administrative records, the USPS,
and the American Community Survey. All models include controls for property characteristics and
indicators of month of sale. Signi¯cance key: + for p<.1, * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for
p<.001.
45High Poverty Medium Poverty Low Poverty Pooled
Vacancies 0-250ft ¡0:021 ¡0:035 ¤ ¤ ¡0:025¤ ¡0:021 ¤ ¤
(0:016) (0:011) (0:012) (0:008)
Delinquencies 0-250ft ¡0:025 ¤ ¤ ¡0:011 ¡0:037¤¤¤ ¡0:024¤¤¤
(0:008) (0:008) (0:009) (0:005)
Vac and Del 0-250ft ¡0:010 0:010 0:005 ¡0:007
(0:012) (0:021) (0:034) (0:008)
Foreclosures 0-250ft 0:026 ¡0:010 ¡0:037 0:011
(0:025) (0:019) (0:023) (0:013)
Del and For 0-250ft 0:006 0:002 ¡0:040 0:018
(0:054) (0:056) (0:060) (0:032)
Vacancies 250-1000ft 0:004 ¡0:006¤ ¡0:010¤¤¤ ¡0:001
(0:003) (0:002) (0:003) (0:002)
Delinquencies 250-1000ft ¡0:004 ¤ ¤ ¡0:005¤¤¤ ¡0:009¤¤¤ ¡0:004¤¤¤
(0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:001)
Vac and Del 250-1000ft ¡0:003 ¡0:030¤¤¤ 0:003 ¡0:004 ¤ ¤
(0:002) (0:005) (0:009) (0:001)
Foreclosures 250-1000ft ¡0:001 ¡0:012¤ ¡0:017 ¤ ¤ ¡0:007+
(0:007) (0:005) (0:006) (0:004)
Del and For 250-1000ft ¡0:020 0:011 ¡0:028 ¡0:012
(0:023) (0:017) (0:025) (0:013)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 10:726¤¤¤ 11:523¤¤¤ 11:397¤¤¤ 11:069¤¤¤
(0:142) (0:094) (0:078) (0:064)
½ 0:437¤¤¤ 0:469¤¤¤ 0:435¤¤¤ 0:657¤¤¤
(0:045) (0:042) (0:033) (0:025)
N 3875 3719 3767 11361
Log Likelihood ¡5588:547 ¡2663:947 ¡1407:935 ¡12144:641
Â2 2226:920 3745:375 6541:740 9234:228
Table 6: Distance Decay Hedonic Price Models. Notes: This table reports coe±cients and standard
errors, in parentheses, from ML regressions of home sale prices on counts of distressed properties
within 0 to 250 feet and 250 to 1000 feet. Data represent sales of single family homes in Cuyahoga
County from April 2010 through June 2011. Data are from Cuyahoga County administrative
records, the USPS, and the American Community Survey. Signi¯cance key: + for p<.1, * for
p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for p<.001.
46High Poverty Medium Poverty Low Poverty Pooled
Vacancies ¡0:004 ¡0:024¤¤¤ ¡0:017¤¤¤ ¡0:012¤¤¤
(0:007) (0:005) (0:005) (0:004)
Delinquencies ¡0:017¤¤¤ ¡0:023¤¤¤ ¡0:024¤¤¤ ¡0:019¤¤¤
(0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:002)
Vac and Del ¡0:010¤ ¡0:047¤¤¤ ¡0:011 ¡0:012¤¤¤
(0:004) (0:010) (0:013) (0:003)
Foreclosures 0:032 ¤ ¤ ¡0:022¤ ¡0:030 ¤ ¤ 0:011+
(0:012) (0:009) (0:010) (0:006)
Del and For ¡0:081¤ ¡0:045 ¡0:021 ¡0:053 ¤ ¤
(0:034) (0:030) (0:037) (0:020)
Buyer - Bank ¡0:401¤¤¤ ¡0:596¤¤¤ ¡0:388¤¤¤ ¡0:442¤¤¤
(0:053) (0:033) (0:026) (0:024)
Buyer - Investor ¡0:476¤¤¤ ¡0:571¤¤¤ ¡0:424¤¤¤ ¡0:512¤¤¤
(0:046) (0:036) (0:032) (0:024)
Buyer - Non-Pro¯t ¡1:921¤¤¤ ¡1:850¤¤¤ 0:027 ¡1:734¤¤¤
(0:161) (0:100) (0:140) (0:080)
Buyer - Federal Agency ¡0:403¤¤¤ ¡0:335¤¤¤ ¡0:458¤¤¤ ¡0:358¤¤¤
(0:065) (0:048) (0:040) (0:033)
Seller - Bank ¡0:810¤¤¤ ¡0:561¤¤¤ ¡0:295¤¤¤ ¡0:623¤¤¤
(0:068) (0:046) (0:035) (0:032)
Seller - Investor ¡0:068 ¡0:040 ¡0:006 ¡0:043+
(0:049) (0:037) (0:029) (0:025)
Seller - Non-pro¯t ¡0:424¤¤¤ ¡0:623¤¤¤ ¡0:256¤ ¡0:344¤¤¤
(0:102) (0:155) (0:123) (0:064)
Seller - Federal Agency ¡0:801¤¤¤ ¡0:500¤¤¤ ¡0:254¤¤¤ ¡0:578¤¤¤
(0:088) (0:050) (0:039) (0:038)
Property Char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 10:721¤¤¤ 11:451¤¤¤ 11:361¤¤¤ 10:994¤¤¤
(0:134) (0:094) (0:074) (0:060)
½ 0:413¤¤¤ 0:305¤¤¤ 0:573¤¤¤ 0:625¤¤¤
(0:045) (0:046) (0:029) (0:026)
N 4520:000 4421:000 4494:000 13435:000
Log Likelihood ¡6642:236 ¡3975:410 ¡1884:044 ¡15114:872
Â2 2801:377 5309:763 7158:449 11690:649
Table 7: Institutional-Sales-Included Hedonic Price Models. Notes: This table reports coe±cients
and standard errors, in parentheses, from ML regressions of home sale prices on counts of distressed
properties within 500 feet. Data represent sales of single family homes in Cuyahoga County from
April 2010 through June 2011. Data are from Cuyahoga County administrative records, the USPS,
and the American Community Survey. Signi¯cance key: + for p<.1, * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and
*** for p<.001.
47Central City Inner Suburbs Outer Suburbs
Vacancies ¡0:008 ¡0:008 ¡0:011¤
(0:009) (0:005) (0:005)
Delinquencies ¡0:011 ¤ ¤ ¡0:016¤¤¤ ¡0:021¤¤¤
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004)
Vac and Del ¡0:023¤¤¤ ¡0:010¤ ¡0:011
(0:007) (0:004) (0:015)
Foreclosures 0:035¤ ¡0:014 ¡0:029¤
(0:014) (0:010) (0:012)
Del and For ¡0:052 ¡0:072¤ 0:029
(0:042) (0:032) (0:036)
N 2808 3875 4678
High Vacancy Medium Vacancy Low Vacancy
Vacancies ¡0:007 ¡0:007 ¡0:013¤
(0:007) (0:005) (0:006)
Delinquencies ¡0:012¤¤¤ ¡0:019¤¤¤ ¡0:003
(0:003) (0:004) (0:005)
Vac and Del ¡0:010¤ ¡0:051¤¤¤ 0:015
(0:005) (0:013) (0:021)
Foreclosures 0:023+ ¡0:020¤ ¡0:036¤
(0:012) (0:009) (0:014)
Del and For ¡0:046 ¡0:021 0:038
(0:035) (0:034) (0:049)
N 3862 3761 3738
Low Price Medium Price High Price
Vacancies ¡0:012+ ¡0:005 ¡0:018 ¤ ¤
(0:007) (0:005) (0:006)
Delinquencies ¡0:011¤¤¤ ¡0:027¤¤¤ ¡0:022¤¤¤
(0:003) (0:004) (0:004)
Vac and Del ¡0:011¤ ¡0:039¤¤¤ ¡0:032¤
(0:005) (0:011) (0:016)
Foreclosures 0:034 ¤ ¤ ¡0:039¤¤¤ ¡0:066¤¤¤
(0:012) (0:010) (0:013)
Del and For ¡0:054 ¡0:021 ¡0:009
(0:035) (0:035) (0:043)
N 3798 3701 3862
Table 8: Alternative Submarket Hedonic Price Models. Notes: This table reports coe±cients and
standard errors, in parentheses, from ML regressions of home sale prices on counts of distressed
properties within 500 feet. Data represent sales of single family homes in Cuyahoga County from
April 2010 through June 2011. Data are from Cuyahoga County administrative records, the USPS,
and the American Community Survey. The vacancy measure is the ratio of vacant residential
properties to total residential properties within each census tract, averaged over the ¯fteen month
period. The home price measure is the census tracts' median home sale price among all sales from
2006 through 2009. The cut points were selected so that roughly one third of the sales are in each
category. Signi¯cance key: + for p<.1, * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for p<.001.
48Figure 4: Coe±cients from alternate speci¯cations. This table reports coe±cients from ML or OLS
regressions of home sale prices on counts of distressed properties within 500 feet. Letters which
appear above the line for their treatment indicate signi¯cance at the 5 percent level or greater (p<
.05). Letters on the line are marginally signi¯cant (.05 < p < .1). Letters below the line indicate
coe±cients that are not statistically signi¯cant. Key:
A - Main model (Table 4)
B - Errors clustered by census tract
C - Spatial lag model
D - Census tract ¯xed e®ects
E - City ¯xed e®ects
F - City ¯xed e®ects and city-speci¯c time trends
G - Including indicators and interactions of high distress counts (¸ 95th percentile)
H - Excluding observations with high distress counts (¸ 95th percentile)
All models include controls for property characteristics and indicators of month of sale. Data
represent sales of single family homes in Cuyahoga County from April 2010 through June 2011.
Data are from Cuyahoga County administrative records, the USPS, and the American Community
Survey.
49Bene¯t to Average Units Per Unit
Sellers (T) Per Month Bene¯t
High Poverty
Vacancies $4,772 6778 $704
Delinquencies $19,123 25636 $746
Vac and Del $3,092 8451 $366
Del and Foreclosed $1,788 284 $6,285
Medium Poverty
Vacancies $12,493 3168 $3,943
Delinquencies $22,057 6774 $3,256
Vac and Del $3,523 881 $3,999
Foreclosures $5,391 1153 $4,678
Low Poverty
Vacancies $7,794 2258 $3,452
Delinquencies $16,523 4316 $3,828
Vac and Del $498 319 $1,563
Foreclosures $5,846 614 $9,529
Table 9: Policy Simulation. \Bene¯t to sellers" is the sum of the di®erences between the predicted
prices from the main model (table 4) using the original data and using data with the row-labeled
type of distressed-home counts set to zero. The bene¯ts and bene¯ts per unit represent the increase
in sales prices which the model suggests would be realized if a policy could eliminate the distressed
properties.
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